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Does "Food for Peace" Assistance 
Damage the Bolivian Economy? 
By MELVIN BURKE* 
Do commodity surplus shipments in fact "encourage eco-
nomic development in the developing countries ... that are 
determined to improve their own agricultural production ... "?l 
Or conversely, is it true that "food aid is damaging to the coun-
tries which receive it, and they should be helped to increase 
the productivity of their own farmers"? 2 The former Bolivian 
Minister of Petroleum, Marcelo Quiroga, who was largely re-
sponsible for the nationalization of the Gulf Oil subsidiary in 
his country, apparently believes "Food for Peace" aid is dam-
aging to the Bolivian economy. In a recent interview with 
Selden Rodman, he had this to say on the subject: 
Your government must realize that other countries want 
to decide on their own m anner of growth. Let me give 
you an example. Every year Bolivia lays out $30 million 
for U.S. food-half of this for wheat and flour , though 
we could grow our own and have the milling facilities. In 
order to keep the price of wheat high, you subsidize your 
wheat farmers. This expensive product is then shipped 
to Bolivia already milled. So there is no work for our 
millers , and our peasants don't grow wheat ... Why? 3 
This paper will attempt to answer Sefior Quiroga's indictment 
* Associate professor of economics, University of Maine. 
1 U.S. Congress , Food for Peace Act of 1966, Public Law 808, 89 
Cong., 2nd Sess., 1966, Sec. 2A an amendment to the Agricultural Trade 
Development and Assistance Act of 1954, Public Law 480, 83 Cong., 
2nd Sess. , 1954. 
2 "Don't Feed the Starving Millions," The Economist, CCXXVIII 
(Sept.-Oct., 1968), 60-61. 
3 Selden Rodman, "Bolivia: Friend or Foe?", National Review, XXII, 
No. 45 (Nov. 17, 1970), 1211 and 1227. 
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of the U.S. "Food for Peace" foreign aid since it is under this 
program that Bolivia spends most of the $15 million for flour 
imports referred to in his statement above. 
To begin with, my major disagreement with ex-minister 
Quiroga and other Bolivian nationalists on this subject is that 
they do not acknowledge the historic need of Bolivia for these 
flour imports or their many benefits to Bolivia before 1968. 
A brief historical sketch of the transition from domestic pro-
duction to importation of flour in Bolivia over the last two 
decades will reveal the basis for my disagreement. 
Since 1952 the Bolivian consumption of flour, the major 
wheat product, increased at the rate of approximately five per-
cent per year. This exceeds the two percent rate of population 
growth and approximates the four percent growth in urbani-
zation.' On the other hand, domestic wheat and flour produc-
tion never was adequate to meet this demand. Thus, Bolivia 
has traditionally been an importer of both wheat and flour. 
However, as cart be seen by an examination of the data in 
table 1, Bolivia has increasingly substituted flour imports for 
domestic production of wheat and flour. 
It would be incorrect to attribute this fundamental change 
in the Bolivian economy to anyone institution, historic event, 
or body politic. Bolivia's traditional dual economy, 1952 social 
revolution, post revolutionary governments as well as the PL 
480 (Food for Peace) program share responsibility for this 
change from domestic production to flour importation. 
Between 1930 and 1951 the Bolivian wheat mills produced 
sufficient flour to supply the entire nation with the exception 
of the large mines which traditionally relied upon imports. 
However, due largely to the inability of the latifundio land 
tenure system 5 to.. provide the domestic mills with wheat of 
acceptable quality in sufficient quantity, increasing portions 
4 The demand for wheat flour is a derived demand for bread and is 
more responsive to changes in urbanization than to changes in either 
total population, national income, or prices. 
5 A latifundio land tenure system is one which is dominated by large 
landed estates. These enterprises are u~ually abstentee-owned and run 
on traditional (customary) rather than pwfit maximizing principles. A 
latifundio (large estate) is not a plantation. The latter is typically 
highly capitalized and foreign owned. 
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TABLE I 
Wheat and Flour : 
Bolivia 1950-1968 
(thousands of metric tons) 
Wheat FLour Productiona FLour 
Production Imports Domesti.c Tm.p01ted Imports 
1950 46 34 10 27 17 
1951 31 32 6 33 33 
1952 24 74 4 25 16 
1953 21 72 3 53 11 
1954 17 59 5 38 19 
1955 17 34 13 37 22 
1956 40 13 2 50 15 
1957 45 55 1 32 63 
1958 62 3 5 14 65 
1959 62 14 3 13 72 
1960 40 3 4 78 
1961 40 5 1 4 102 
1962 50 21 3 4 94 
1963 55 19 4 5 103 
1964 58 5 6 4 96 
1965 42 16 4 11 109 
1966 36 15 3 14 108 
1967 39 27 5 14 128 
1968 45 47 12'; 16 98 
a Based upon a 75% extraction yield 
* AID estimate. 
Source: Bolivia, Direccion General de Estadisticas y Censos. 
of Bolivian flour were milled from imported wheat. Thus, one 
finds in Bolivia's historic dual economy and traditional agri-
cultural sector a beginning of wheat and flour imports sub-
stituting for domestic production. 
The revolution of 1952 and the agrarian reform of 1953 
undoubtedly disrupted traditional producing and marketing 
channels giving rise to a decrease in domestic production of 
wheat for the market. G Concurrent with these revolutionary 
effects, the hyperinflation of 1952-1956 and the existent mul-
tiple exchange rate favored imports , making it increasingly 
lucrative to substitute wheat-and to a lesser extent flour-
" In August (1953, less than one year after the revolution, the Movi-
mien to Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) Government of Bolivia 
passed the Decreto de la Reforma Agraria and proceeded to redistribute 
tile lands of the Latifundios to the former Indian peasants. In addition, 
theMNR government nationalized the large tin mines, decreed uni-
versal suffrage, and instituted other economic and social reforms. 
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imports for domestic output,7 The MNR revolution, land re-
form, and inflation were, therefore, events contributing to 
increased importation of wheat and flour. 
Shortly after the monetary stabilization program was suc-
cessfully implemented in 1957, flour imports increasingly 
replaced wheat imports. One plausible explanation for this 
change is that the Bolivian millers found it unprofitable to mill 
imported wheat from 1952 to 1957 because of their inability 
to dispose of the wheat bran by-products at a high enough 
price. At the same time they apparently began to realize that 
flour importation, unlike wheat importation, posed no by-
product disposal problem. 
There can be little doubt that the U.S. Point IV and Food 
for Peace programs encouraged these flour imports by offer-
ing surplus flour to the Bolivian government at below world 
market prices. Indeed, these surplus commodity shipments 
more nearly resembled grants than sales. This is especially 
true between 1960 and 1968 when Bolivia purchased large 
quantities of U. S. flour with domestic currency under Title I 
of PL 480.8 From that date to the present, PL 480 flour im-
ports have had a greater influence upon the Bolivian wheat 
and flour industries than any other single factor. Table 2 
below clearly shows the overwhelming dominance of these 
flour imports from the United States since 1960. 
In sum, PL 480 surplus food assistance to Bolivia which 
began in 1961 was not the first or only influence in the transi-
tion from domestic production to importation of flour in Bo-
livia over the last twenty years. Bolivian nationalists, like 
Marcelo Quiroga, are, however, correct in pointing out that 
once on the scene, these "free" PL 480 surplus commodity 
imports not only accelerated the process of importation, but 
7 The overvalued official rate applied to wheat and flour imports since 
these were considered "basic food necessities." Combined with the lise 
in domestic prices, this gave a windfall profit to wheat and flour im-
porters thereby encouraging the substitution of imports for domestic 
production. 
s Title lof Public Law 480 (The Agricultural Trade Development and 
Assistance Act of 1954) authorized the President of the United States 
to "negotiate and carry out agreements with friendly nations or organi-
zations of friendly nations to provide for the sale of surplus agricultural 
commodities for foreign currencies." 
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TABLE II 
.Bolivian Flour Imports 
(thousands of metric tons) 
U.S .A.a Argentina Othersb 
1950 6 5 6 
1951 21 12 
1952 9 7 
1953 8 2 1 
1954 15 4 1 
1955 5 17 
1956 3 10 2 
1957 35 28 
1958 24 41 
1959 13 57 1 
1960 46 15 16 
1961 63 23 15 
1962 66 16 12 
1963 82 7 15 
1964 93 3 
1965 91 7 10 
1966 92 10 6 
1967 119 5 4 
1968 84 13 1 
a No reliable data exist on quantity of flour imported from U.S. per 
calendar year under PL 480 agreements. An estimate can be made 
using fiscal year shipments as a guide . About 95% of all flour imports 
from U.S. over the years 1961-68 were PL 480 imports and roughly 75% 
of these flour imports fell under Title r. 
b Major other exporters include Canada, Chile and West Germanv. 
These figures are residuals. 
Source: Bolivia, Direcci6n General de Estadisticas y Censos. 
rendered it virtually irreversible. Nevertheless, the benefits to 
the Bolivians from this program before 1968 were numerous 
and impressive. First of all, Bolivia could not have imported 
these large quantities of flour on more favorable terms than 
those obtained under Title I, PL 480. Before 1968 Bolivia 
paid for these flour imports with local currency generated 
from their domestic sales. Because nearly 75 percent of these 
counterpart funds were spent in Bolivia on developmental 
projects, they, in fact, constituted a grant in kind to the Bo-
livian government and people. Consequently, Bolivia was able 
to import high quality flour in quantities sufficient to satisfy 
increasing portions of her domestic demand paid for with 
grants from the supplier. The urban population, miners, and 
other consumers of flour were, in the process, subsidized. The 
campesinos (peasants) benefited from land titling, coloniza-
tion, community development, and other rural programs fi-
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nanced with counterpart funds . The miller-importers were 
apparently content with the profits received from importing 
flour to let their mills lie idle or underutilized. n The Bolivian 
government used significant amounts of the local currency 
generated from PL 480 flour sales for, among other things, 
general budget support. In short, these enormous flour grants 
apparently averted a food crisis without draining Bolivia's 
scarce foreign exchange while simultaneously creating large 
stocks of local currency to be utilized for developmental in-
vestments, central government budget support, and other uses. 
The Bolivians were not the only ones who benefited from 
this program, however. PL 480 flour shipments to Bolivia were 
also benefiicial to the United States. They not only disposed 
of part of the wheat and flour surpluses resulting from the 
Commodity Credit Corporation Farm Price Support Program, 
but, in addition, generated the local currency to help finance 
the U.S. Embassy and AID Mission in Bolivia. What better 
way to dispose of surplus commodities than to use them to 
pay for one's overseas activities! 
Or perhaps one should say, who benefits least from the 
"Food for Peace" program since all available evidence indi-
cates that the net effect of this program is now "damaging" 
to Bolivia's economy as well as to the U.S. foreign aid program. 
While most Bolivians, including Marcelo Quiroga, intuitively 
know this to be true, their interpretation of why these flour 
imports are detrimental to their nation's developmental efforts 
is often misleading or incorrect. Because a nation can grow 
and mill its own wheat is no economic justification for doing 
so. "Food for Peace' 'flour shipments are not per se "damag-
ing" to the Bolivian economy. Rather, it is the manner in 
which the program was handled in the past and the recent 
changes in finance which have rendered it so. From the be-
ginning PL 480 flour shipments supplanted rather than sup-
plemented domestic output. Very little of the funds obtained 
from the sale of these imports were utilized to increase the 
domestic output of wheat and flour.lO Subsequently, by 1968 
o See Appendix A, for a brief account of the transformation of 
Bolivian millers into importers. 
10 Since 1961, AID has provided over $200 million in loans and grants 
to Bolivia. Approximately $70 million of this amount was road loans. 
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lese commodity imports no longer constituted a grant to 
olivia as they did in the past for PL 808 (amendment to PL 
80) which stipulated that Bolivia pay for Title I flour ship-
ents with long term dollar credits rather than PesosY 
As the situation now stands, Bolivia is paying dollars, on 
:tremely favorable credit terms , to import flour for consump-
m while rural underemployment and excess capacity exists 
the domestic wheat flour mills, transportation, and related 
dustries. Bolivia is obligating and spending foreign exchange 
purchase flour, a consumption good which is apparently 
pable of being efficiently produced domestically, instead of 
lrchasing capital goods which she is unable to produce, but 
lich are indispensable to economic development. l ~ Conse-
endy, had this change in finance not occurred, it would be 
tremely difficult to state categorically whether the overall 
t effect of these flour shipments was detrimental or bene-
ial to the economic development of Bolivia. 
tn summary, "Food for Peace" flour shipments to Bolivia 
ltributed to the rapid increase in domestic consumption, 
l nothing to increase the domestic production of wheat, and 
j an adverse effect upon the Bolivian milling industry lead-
: to a decline in domestic flour production. In this way the 
)gram was partially responsible for widening the gap be-
~en domestic production and consumption of wheat flour 
:essitating increased importation. Finally, in 1968 when 
ivia was dependent upon flour imports to satisfy almost 
entire effective domestic demand, the U.S. government 
.nged the program from one of grants to long-term dollar 
lculture has always received low priority from both the Bolivian gov-
nent and the AID mission: Even then, rice production was encour-
1 with loans and grants totaling $1,750,000 since 1962. Sugar and 
r agricultural products received comparable assistance. Wheat, on 
other hand, received its first loan of $200,000 in 1967 and another 
>,000 loan in 1969. As of this date, less than half of the first wheat 
of $200,000 has been dispersed . 
Section 103(b), Title I of PL 808 reads "take steps to assure a 
ressive transition from sales for foreign currencies to sales for dol-
.. . at a rate whereby the transition can be completed by December 
.971." 
It could be argued that any increases in resources such as PL 480 
imports are capital imports, but they are not physicial capital goods 
,rts. Pesos cannot buy needed capital goods produced abroad. 
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loans. At least with respect to Bolivia's experience with the 
PL 480 (and later PL 808) food aid program, it would appear 
that the overall net effect was "damaging" to her economy. 
Thus, while I may disagree with Senor Quiroga and other 
brilliant young Bolivians on a number of significant details, 
I agree with them that the present "Food for Peace" program 
is detrimental to their economy and that the policy must be 
changed. 
Bolivia should, therefore, begin to implement a policy of 
flour imports substitution as soon as possible and the United 
States should cooperate in this endeavor. Recent technological 
advances in wheat production have, for the first time in Bo-
livian history, made such a policy both technically and eco~ 
nomically feasible. This fact is all too often ignored by Bo~ 
livian nationalists who advocate a policy of flour import sub-
stitution. Perhaps, however, they are simply not aware of the 
important role improved seed such as Corpuso or Mexican 
Jaral plays in this national decision. In any event, they will 
find a great deal of support for their position in what follows. 
To begin with, the argument against flour import substitution 
will be briefly considered and then dismissed. It has been 
argued that Bolivia should import flour since she suffers a com-
parative disadvantage in growing wheat and milling flour. 
Therefore, Bolivia would do well to allocate her scarce re-
sources to the production of other goods in which . she has a 
relative advantage. The Bolivian economy was not, is not, 
nor will be in the foreseeable future, a fully employed econ-
omy. It is virtually impossible to argue comparative advan-
tage when such conditions exist. In addition, all infant in-
dustries, such as Bolivian wheat and milling using traditional 
methods of production, dated technology, and possibly less 
than optimum size plant, are initially at a competitive disad-
vantage with respect to similar established industries abroad. 
This is especially true if wheat and flour are imported at be-
low commercial world market prices as they are under the 
"Food for Peace" program. Therefore, the problem cannot be 
viewed as one of allocating scarce resources among alternative 
productions within a static economic framework to achieve 
some ideal efficiency optimum. The real issue is not whether 
Bolivia should be self-sufficient in wheat and flour or that these 
Bolivian products should compete in the world market, but 
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f~Hier whether domestic production can be increased by em-
~!~}'ing existing idle r~sources. to conse~ve foreign exchange 
f6:l.'ultimate use in the ImportatIOn of capItal goods not capable 
8f<domestic production. In sum, when viewed in a dynamic 
growth setting one arrive~ at the co.nclusion that not only can 
Bolivia substitute domestIc productIOn of wheat and flour for 
imports, but she must. 
If Bolivia does not immediately begin a crash program to 
illcrease domestic output, she can look forward to continued 
stagnation of her wheat and flour industries as well as con 
tinued drain on her foreign exchange. The adverse effect of 
these on economic development, the central government 
budget, the balance of payments, and the external debt are 
obvious. In table III below is provided an estimate of the 
~~?itional expenditure of foreign exchange over the ten year 
period 1969-1978, for wheat and flour imports, assuming a 
{olir percent per year increase in consumption and no change 
in domestic production. 
Thus, even if Bolivia obtained all her wheat and flour im-
ports under PL 808 with favorable terms of 2% percent in-
terest with 20 years to pay, by 1978 she will have spent the 
equivalent of $72,643,600 and incurred a foreign exchange 
debt of $211,288,600 for these same imports. It is, however, 
only fair to add that an equivalent value of local currency 
would be generated in the process, nearly all of which would 
be invested in Bolivia. But taking into consideration the fact 
that these pesos would be purchased with dollars, the benefit 
to Bblivia would be substantially lessened. 
If, on the other hand, a policy of promoting domestic pro-
duction of wheat and flour to substitute for imports of the 
same were implemented, the gains to the Bolivian economy 
could be both immediate and substantial. Initially, top pri-
pritYivvould be assigned to increasing the quality and quantity 
of. Bolivian wheat. Widespread introduction of such non-tradi-
t!bIialinputs as improved seed and fertilizer into Bolivian 
\V~~~fgr()?l1ction over the same ten-year period could result 
insubstantial increase in domestic wheat production. Im-
prbved.seed, such as Corpuso or Mexican J aral, has been esti-
mafedtbi:ncrease yield between 60 percent and 100 percent 
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TABLE III 
ESTIMATES OF PRODUCTION AND IMPORTATION OF WHEAT 
WITHOUT A SUCCESSFUL WHEAT PROGRAM: BOLIVIA 1969-1978' 
--=:::: 
Foreign 
Exchange 
Domestic Spent on 
Consumption Production Imports Imp07tsc 
(000 M.T.) (000 M.T.) (000 M.T.) ($000) 
1969 233.0 45.0 188.0 1,136.9 
1970 242.4 45.0 197.4 2,330.6 
1971 252.1 45.0 207.1 3,583.0 
1972 262.2 45.0 217.2 4,896.5 
1973 272.7 45.0 227.7 6,273.5 
1974 283.6 45.0 238.6 7,716.4 
1975 294.9 45.0 249.9 9,227.6 
1976 306.7 45.0 261.7 10,810.2 
1977 319.0 45.0 274.0 12,467.2 
1978 331.8 45.0 286.8 14,201.6 
1969-1978 450.0 2,348.4 72,643.5 
1969-1997 284,032.1 
a Based upon projections of B. Delworth Gardner, Prospects for a 
Successful Wheat Program (unpublished report, 1968), pp. 26 and 28. 
b Assuming each metric ton of imported wheat equivalent costs, on 
the average, $95.80. 
c Assuming all imported wheat equivalents paid for in U. S. dollars 
at 2lj2 percent interest over 20 years with no grace period. 
(from .6 to .9 or 1.2 metric tons per hectare) .l:{ This wheat is 
of the hard variety demanded by Bolivian millers and con-
sumers. Consequently, it commands a higher price, and the 
expected returns to the farmer are significanLl1 Thus a "new 
seed for old seed" program for Bolivia is the first step. Among 
the merits of this program is the fact that it is a low cost pro-
gram requiring little if any foreign exchange outlay. Also, if 
fertilizer is introduced in conjunction with improved seed. the 
anticipated increase in output is much greater. It is not un-. 
realistic to expect an output of 234,000 metric tons of im-
proved domestic wheat by the year 1978, equal to 70 percent 
of Bolivia's projected needs if a national wheat program were 
rigiorously and promptly carried out. Table IV reveals esti-
mates of expected increases in domestic output for the years 
1:) B. Delworth Gardner, Prospects for a Sllccessflll Program in Bolivia, 
( unpublished report , June, 1968), pp. 14-18. 
14 B. Delworth Gardner estimates that a Bolivian campesino can ex-
pect to realize a net profit per hectare of $47.20 by substituting im-
proved seed for criollo (unimproved domestic) seed. Ibid. 
DAMAGE TO BOLIVIAN ECONOMY 13 
TABLE IV 
]!1STIlV1ATES OF PRODUCTION AND IMPORTATION OF WHEAT 
WITH A SUCCESSFUL WHEAT PROGRAM: BOLIVIA 1969-1978a 
~ Foreign 
Exchange 
Domestic Spent on 
Consumption Production Importsb Importsc 
(000 M.T.) (000 M.T.) (000 M.T.) ($ U.S. 000) 
1969 233.0 52.2 180.8 1,093.3 
1970 242.4 64.2 178.2 2,170.9 
1971 252.1 77.7 174.4 3,125.6 
1972 262.2 92.9 169.3 4,249.4 
1.973 272.7 110.3 162.4 5,231.4 
1974 283.6 129.7 153.9 6,162.1 
1975 294.9 151.4 143.5 7,030.0 
1976 306.7 176.0 130.7 7,820.3 
1977 319.0 203.3 115.7 8,520.0 
'1978 331.8 234.0 97.8 9,111.4 
J969-1978 1,291.0 1,506.7 54,614.4 
1969-1997 182,228.9 
a Based upon projections of B. Delworth Gardner, Prospects for a Suc-
cessful Wheat Progmm (unpublished report, 1968), pp. 26 and 28. 
b Assuming each metric ton of imported wheat equivalent costs, on 
the average, $95.80. 
c Assuming all imported wheat equivalents paid for in U. S. dollars 
at 21/2 percent interest over 20 years with no grace period. 
1969-1978 assuming an eight percent increase in acreage 
planted with Corpuso seed each year, half of which is fertilized. 
The projections in table IV are based on the assumption that 
the increased domestic wheat production would be milled into 
,flour. In light of what has been said about the Bolivian milling 
industry, it is unrealistic to expect increases in domestic wheat 
output to be automatically milled into flour. However, there 
are no problems related to the milling processes which are in-
surmountable. As domestic wheat production is augmented 
over the years, the Bolivian government would have to restrict 
wheat and flour imports to that portion of national needs not 
satisfied by domestic supply. The government would also be 
required to time such imports so as not to conflict with the 
harvest and milling of domestic wheat. Above all, the govern-
ment should adopt new tax, import, and pricing policies which 
could enable the miller-importers to obtain a greater profit 
in milling wheat than in importing flour. Another appropriate 
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policy change would be to eliminate or reduce the five percent 
above cost profit guarantee presently granted to importers of 
flour. 
Fortunately, the abundant excess capacity in the Bolivian 
milling industry could immediately be put into productive use. 
As the mills expand the production of flour using improved 
domestic wheat, they would realize some economies inasmuch 
as wages, electrical, water , and other overhead costs decrease 
per unit of output with greater utilization of existing excess 
capacity. In adidtion, studies have shown that it is those 
mills located in the producing areas milling domestic wheat 
that presently make the greatest profits. 1 r. All of this augurs 
well for the future profitability of the Bolivian milling industry. 
However, new investments would be required for retooling, 
modernization, and expansion. 1 6 In addition, since all reports 
on the Bolivian milling industry single out by-product disposal 
as the number one problem of the industry today, there is every 
reason to expect this situation to become critical once produc-
tion begins its rapid increase." However, this area n eeds fur-
ther investigation in depth, and until the mills do operate at 
near capacity using relatively inexpensive domestic wheat any 
prediction as to the future profitability of Bolivian milling is 
pure conjecture. Even if by-product disposal was a problem for 
the future, the cost of subsidizing by-product sales would prob-
ably be more than offset by the benefits, not only to the wheat 
and flour industries, but also the poultry, livestock, and other 
industrial users of wheat bran. 
Indeed, the potential benefit to Bolivia of such a successful 
wheat and flour program appear to be so great as to over-
whelm any costs incurred. In spite of the fact that Bolivia 
would probably still not be self-sufficient in flour after 1978, 
1" Jan Boomkamp, Diagnostico Sobre La Economia Triguera de Bolivia 
( unpublished report, April, 1966 ), passim. 
11; The Bolivian Millers Associa tion claims tha t the industr y is pres-
ently expanding its capacity to approximately 215,000 m etric tons of 
wheat per year. 
17 The Boomkamp report points out tha t no profits can be made in 
the Bolivian mills unless these by-products are disposed of at some re-
munera tive price since they constitute about eight percent of the mills ' 
total revenue. 
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a comparison of tables 3 and 4 show that a sa::gs of ovher 
$10'0,000,000 of foreign exchange could be re ed by t e 
successful · accomplishment of such a program. 
TABLE V 
EsTIMATES OF PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS OF WHEAT 
WITH AND WITHOUT A SUCCESSFUL WHEAT 
PROGRAM: BOLIVIA 1969-1978 
(a comparison of Tables 3 and 4 above) 
(000 M.T. ) 
Total 
Domestic 
Wheat 
Production 
Without a Suc-
cc~ssf~l Wheat 
;Program 450,000 
hWith a Suc-
cessful Wheat 
Program 1,291,000 
Difference 
Due to 
Program +841,000 
Imports 
of Wheat 
Equivalents 
(000 M.T.) 
2,348,000 
1,506,700 
Foreign 
Exchange 
Spent on 
Imports 
($ U.S.) 
72,643,500 
54,614,400 
Exchange Debts 
Total Foreign 
Accumulated 
as a Result 
of Importation 
($ U.s.) 
284,032,100 
182,228,900 
-841,700 -18,029,100 -101,803,200 
In addition, these increases in domestic flour production would 
J:l~ve ramifications throughout the entire Bolivian economy. 
The large increases in national income and employment gener-
ated each year by the wheat farms, flour mills, transportation 
industries, by-products industries, and others would be in-
cr,~ased many times over as the income flows multiplied 
through the economy. 
\Vhile it is extremely difficult to estimate the costs of this 
national wheat and flour program, an approximation of money 
costs for the wheat program only would be about $2 million 
for new seed, $9 million for fertilizer, and some undetermined 
amount for agricultural extension services. To this must be 
~?ded the money costs of mill investment and subsidy by-
pr'oduct disposal. However, most of these are local currency 
costs whereas a large portion of the benefits is in dollar sav-
ings. Many of the local currency costs could be paid for with 
the $20 million of counterpart funds presently available from 
past sales of "Food for Peace" flour imports. 
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Perhaps all these calculations are misleading since the real 
costs of the program are opportunity costs such as foregone 
income, employment, and foreign exchange savings from do- · 
mestic production of wheat and flour. That is to say, the real 
costs of a Bolivian wheat and flour program as outlined in this 
paper are continued stagnation of the rural sector, perpetu-
ation of the dual economy, and future monetary difficulties.1s 
Inasmuch as the United States is concerned with these prob-
lems, they also become opportunity costs to the U. S. Mission 
in Bolivia and the U. S. government and people at home. 
These costs would exceed any conceivable benefit to either the 
United States or Bolivia if continuation of the present program 
of importing flour under PL 808 at the expense of domestic 
production is continued. 
In sum, there are no major technical or economic obstacles 
to instituting a new policy of flour import substitution, and 
the potential benefits many. The problem, as ex-minister 
Quiroga points out is a political one. When asked by Mr. 
Rodman, "Why don't you grow your own wheat and grind it?", 
he replied: 
Because our government makes a profit on the sale of 
your wheat. . .. I tried to reverse this policy when I was 
in the cabinet but the commercial interests were too 
strong.
'
!! 
Conclusion 
Bolivia's experience with aid in the form of commodity sur-
plus shipments should provide some guidelines for the con-
tinued or future use of this unique type of foreign aid. While 
"Food for Peace" assistance is not inherently detrimental to 
the agricultural economies of the lesser developed countries, 
they can easily become so as the Bolivian experience has 
shown. When this occurs, explanations are necessary and a 
change of policy is imperative. Whether or not this type of 
foreign aid program should be continued is less important 
than the manner in which it is carried out. The timing, size, 
and finance of commodity surplus shipments as well as the 
expenditure of the counterpart funds will ultimately determine 
l ~ These could include budget , balance of payments and/or foreign 
debt servicing difficulties. 
19 Seldom Rodman, p. 1227. 
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its failure or success. Unless greater care is taken in the future 
with "Food for Peace," this ostensibily low cost assistance may 
become the most costly program this country has yet under-
taken. 
APPENDIX A: THE BOLIVIAN MILLER-IMPORTERS 
In 1963 the Bolivian government fixed the wholesale price 
of all flour at $6.58 per hundredweight in La Paz, Oruro, and 
Potosi, and slightly higher prices in the other cities depending 
upon transportation costs. Not only was the price of flour 
fixed, but the government also guaranteed importers of PL 
480 flour a five percent above cost net revenue return . Conse-
quently, the Bolivian miller-importers elected to import flour 
rather than mill domestic or imported wheat. To begin with, 
the poor quality and erratic supply of domestic wheat ac-
counted for the millers' reluctance to mill more than a small 
fraction of the nation's output. The apparent inability of the 
millers to dispose of their bran by-product explains why they 
were not eager to mill large quantities of imported wheat. 
Most important, however, is the fact that the uncertainties of 
flour production included the possibility of encountering eco-
nomic losses whereas importation of flour was a guaranteed 
profitable undertaking. For example, a well documented study 
of the Bolivian milling industry for the years 1963-1965 by 
Jan Boomkamp, shows that the Simsa Mill (Oruro) obtained 
net revenues of $6.16 per metric ton of flour produced while 
Molinera Boliviana (La Paz) earned $3.22 per metric ton. 
The owners of both these mills were also importers who over 
the same time period earned net revenues of $6.63 metric ton 
of imported flour. 20 Bedoya and Grace, accounting for approxi-
mately 65 percent of the nation's total milling capacity, 
changed their primary function from flour production to flour 
importation. In table 6 below, both are shown to be under-
utilizing their flour mills and importing greater quantities of 
flour than they produce. 
The Bolivian millers also extracted 75 percent flour from a 
given quantity of wheat instead of the usual 72 percent in 
order to obtain a greater portion of high value flour as well 
as to minimize the output of low value by-product which is, as 
stated above, difficult to sell. In so doing, however, they low-
20 Jan Boomkamp, Tables 11 and 21. 
18 INTER-AMERICAN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS 
TABLE VI 
MILLER-IMPORTERS, BEDOYA AND GRACE 
Mill Capacity (M.T. flour per year)a 
Mill Capacity as Percent of National Total 
Flour Production (M.T. average 1961-1967) 
Flour Production as Percent of Capacity 
(average 1961-1967) 
Wheat Imports (M.T.) 
Flour Imports (M.T. ) 
Grace 
17,280 
21 
2,967 
17 
3,793b 
38,842b 
a Assuming a 75 percent extraction rate of flour from wheat. 
Bedoya 
37,800 
45 
7,719 
20 
10,472c 
10,075c 
b Average for 1961-1967. The 38,842 M.T. average includes imports 
by Grace for other companies. 
c Average for years 1965-1967 only. 
ered the quality of domestic flour making it even more non-
competitive with imported flour. In an attempt to prevent the 
complete collapse of the Bolivian milling industry, the govern-
ment decreed that one out of every four parts of flour sold in 
Bolivia must be of national origin. In light of what has been 
said above, it is not surprising that as a result of these actions, 
the Bolivian milling industry only utilized between 25 percent 
25 percent and 30 percent of total capacity in 1968 as seen 
below. The reader will note that once again Senor Quiroga is 
only partially correct when he says that Bolivia has sufficient 
milling facilities. From table 6 above, one can see that were 
Bolivia to cease importing flour tomorrow, she would not have 
adequate plant and equipment to mill over 100,000 additional 
metric tons of flour. 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
TABLE VII 
WHEAT MILLED AS A PERCENTAGE OF CAPACITY 
ESTIMATES: BOLIVIA 1950-1968 
Minister of Bolivian Millers' 
Agriculture Estimatea Association Estimatea 
56 
60 
44 
84 
66 
76 
78 
51 
29 
24 
11 
45 
48 
35 
67 
53 
61 
63 
41 
23 
19 
09 
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1961 08 06 
1962 11 08 
1963 15 12 
1964 16 12 
1965 24 19 
1966 26 21 
1967 28 23 
1968 32 26 
a Absolute estimated capacities: Ministry of Agriculture = 88,000 
metric tons and Bolivian Millers' Association = 110,000 metric tons . 
Source: Direcci6n General de Estadisticas y Censos. 
